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This paper - a product of the (former) Financial  Policy and Systems Division, Country Economics
Depatnient - is part of a larger effort in the department  to study issues associated  with the structure,
operation,  and soundness  of banking  and financial  systems.  Copies  of the  paper  are available  free  from  the
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,,  DC 20433. Please contact Bobo Lu, room N9-005,
extension  37664  (February 1993,  19 pages).
In recent years, instability  of the banking  system  functioning  banking  and payments  system,
has returned  as a major problem  in many  would subsiantially  reduce  the resources
countries,  particularly  in the developing  world.  committed  to banking  supervision,  would
In many  eases, this instability  has been  so  prevent  bank-type  regulation  from expanding  to
threatening  to financial  intermediation  and the  the rest of the financial  system,  and would  place
functioning  of the payments  system that  banking  and nonbanking  organizations  on a level
governments  have felt compelled  to intervene  playing  field for the financial  activities  in which
and rcstructure  banks,  often at considerable  cost  they  compete.
to the public budget.
There are two major  problems  with the
One response  to these  problems  has been a  proposal.  First, it might  be difficult  to implement
proposal  to create  failproof  banking  systems  - because  of too few riskless  assets in a nation's
to radically  transform  the structure,  priorities,  financial  system.  (Talley  suggests  several
and operation  of the banking  and financial  modifications  that would alleviate  this problem
systems.  Banks would  be limited  to issuing  in some  countries.)  Second,  the proposal  might
deposits,  holding  essentially  riskless  portfolios,  hurt the financial  market  by (I) increasing
and operating  the  payments  system.  To minimize  interest  rates for higher-risk  borrowers,  forcing
the resulting  disruptions  to the financial  systoci,  them  out of the market,  and (2) transfering
banks would be authorized  (and encouraged)  to  greater  risk to the nonbank  sector  of the financial
set up holding  companies  and then transfer  to  system,  making it more  susceptible  to crisis.
holding  company  affiliates  all the functions  -
including  lending  - that banks would  no longer  Although  the proposal  would benefit  devel-
be permitted  to perform.  So while  the failproof-  oping countries  (more  prone to banking  instabil-
banking  proposal would  severely  restrict  the  ity) more than industrial  countries,  it would  also
activity  of banks, it would  not restrict  the activi-  be more difficult  to implement  in developing
ties of banking  organizations  that convert  to a  countries.  And the adverse  effects  of the pro-
holding  company  form of organization.  posal would  be felt more severely  in the financial
markets  of developing  countries  than in indus-
This proposal  would produce  major public  trial countries,  which have deeper,  more respon-
benefits.  It would  assure a nation  of a smoothly  sive financial  markets.
The  Policy  Rescarch  Working  Paper  Series  dissemninates  the  findings  of work  under  way  in  the Bank.  An objective  of the  series
is to gct these fndings out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The fimdings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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Samuel H.  Talley *
In the last decade  or so, banking  instability  has again  emerged  as a serious  economic
problem. While  this instability  has been  particularly  prevalent  in the developing  countries,  it
has also  afflicted  such  relatively  stable  and prosperous  countries  as the United  States  and
Norway. In order to avoid potentially  serious  damage  to their financial  systems  and
payments  mechanisms,  governments  in most  of these  countries  have  felt compelled  to
intervene  and restructure  some  or all of the banks  in trouble,  often  at considerable  cost to the
public  budget. Subsequently,  many  of these  governments  also have  taken  steps  to diminish
the risk of future  instability. These  steps have  included  strengthening  the prudeniial
provisioixs  of the banking  law, improving  bank  supervisory  policies  and procedures,
upgrading  bank accounting  and auditing,  and, in some  countries,  introducing  some  forn of
deposit  insurance. To date, these  remedial  efforts  appear  to have  had mixed  results,  as
instability  has reoccurred  in some  of the countries.'
*  The author  wishes  to thank  Andrew  Sheng,  Gerald  Caprio,  Ross Levine  and Robert
Lawrence  for helpful  comments  on an earlier  draft  of this paper.
IFor a deailed  discusion  of the causes  of banking  instability  in recent  years  and the efforts  that govemments  have made  to counter
the  problem, see The  World  Bank,  World  Development  Repot  1989.Given the inability of many countries to achieve banking stability, this study presents
and evaluates  a proposal to create fail-proof  banking systems. This proposal is similar in
form to the so-called "narrow bank" proposal that was originally  developed  in the United
States in the mid 1980s  and has since been discussed extensively  in both public policy and
academic circles in that country. 2 However, unlike the narrow bank proposal, which was
basically designed to expand the permissible  activities  of banking  organizations, the primary
objective of the fail-proof baning  proposal is to assure that nations  will permanently  have
sound banking systems and dependable  payments mechanisms.
The fail-proof  banking proposal is based on the proposition that rwtions  have
inappropriately  ranked the priorities of their financial  system, have misallocated  functions
among major entities in the system, and have improperly  distributed  risk amor.g  these
entities.  With specific regard to the banking system, nations  have given banks the crucial
functions  of operating the payments  system and providing  the bulk of the nation's money
supply, and then have allowed banks to take risks and engage in various nonessential
functions  that have often undermined  the effective  performance  of their crucial functions.
To change this situation, the fail-proof banking  proposal would radically  alter the
structure and operation of the banking and financial  system. Henceforth, banks would be
confined  to issuing deposits, holding  riskless  1 jortfolios, and operating the payments system.
These restrictions  would sever the traditional  link between banks issuing  deposits and lending
to the public.  The proposal also calls on banks to convert to the bank holding company  form
Zhe narrow  bank  proposl  was  originally  developed  by Robert  J. Lawrence  and  was  subsequantly  elaborated  upon  by Robert  Lan.
For  a detiled  discusion  of the  proposal,  see  Robert  J. Lawrence,  *Minimizing  Regulation  of the  Fiancial  Services  Industry,' Isas  inJ
Rhgulhtion  (Summer  1985),  pp. 22-31;  and Robert  Litan What  Should  Banks  Do?. 'Me Brooking  stitution,  1987. For a high  level
govemenat  eview  of the  prpoul,  ee  United  States  Department  of Treaury,  Modernizing  the  Financial  System:  Recommendations  for  Safer,
Mome  Comnetitive  Bank,  Febnrary  1991,  pp.  VIl 24-30.
-2-of organization, and then transfer to holding  company  affiliates all of the functions, including
lending, that banks would no longer be permitted to perform.  Accordingly,  while the fail-
proof banking  proposal would greatly restrict the activities of banks, it would not restrict the
activities  of banldng organizadons that choose to operate through the holding  company
device.
This study is contained in six sections.  Following this introductory section, the fail-
proof banking proposal is described in detail in section two.  In the third section, the major
public benefits that would be derived from the proposal are identified  and evaluated. The
fourth section discusses  possible implementation  problems that could make the proposal
infeasible, and then offers ways to overcome these problems.  The fifth section  discusses the
financial market effects of the proposal and identifies  the two major social costs associated
with fail-proof  banking.  The sixth section summarizes  the study and offers some concluding
thoughts, including  the applicability  of fail-proof banking to developed  versus developing
countries.
Creating a Fail-Proof  Banking System
In the world of fail-proof banking, banks would operate much like present day money
market funds.  On the liability side of their balance sheet, fail-proof  banks would be limited
to issuing only transactions  and short-term time deposits.  Banks would be encouraged  to pay
market rates of interest on these deposits  and to levy service charges for processing
transactions  that would fully cover the bank's costs.  Banks also would  be the only
-3-institutions  in the economy that would be permitted to issue payments instruments, thereby
giving banks a monopoly  on the operation of the payments mechanism. On the asset side of
their balance sheets, fail-proof  banks would be required to hold essentially  riskless portfolios.
To accomplish  this objective, banks would be limited to acquiring assets that have no credit
risk.  In addition, fail-proof banks would be required to avoid any meaningful  amount of
interest rate risk by holding relatively short-term assets, thereby closely matching  the
repricing intervals of their assets and liabilities. Finally, banks would be forbidden  to engage
in various risk-bearing  activities (such as bond trading, foreign exchange operations, and
issuing various forms of guarantees), because these activities could result in losses and cause
banks to fail.
Even with these severe restrictions  on banks, it would not be possible to totaly
eliminate  risk.  Moreover, there is always the possibility  that a baiik might become  a victim
of fraud.  Consequently,  fail-proof banks would be required to maintain  a small amount of
equity capital to act as a buffer against these irreducible risks.
In order to assure the achievement  of a fail-proof  banking system, several other
conditions should prevail.  First, the government  should conduct periodic examinations  of
fail-proof  banks to assure that -.ese banks were operating in accordance  with all fail-proof
restrictions  and were not subject to fraud.  These examinations,  however, would be far less
labor intensive than traditional  bank examinations  because there would  be no need tv review
and evaluate the quality of a large number of bank assets.  Second, in the unlikely  event that
fail-proof banks should ever experience  a liquidity  problem, they would be authorized  to
borrow from the central bank.  For this purpose, these banks would have a large amount of
-4-assets that could readily serve as collateral.  Third, in the highly unlikely  event that a fail-
proof bank should ever fail, the government  would provide 100  percent deposit insurance in
order to assure the preservation of public confidence  in the banking and payments systems.
In conventional  banking systems, deposit insurance is often criticized  because it tends to
remove market discipline  and encourage bank management  to take greater risks.  This would
not be a problem in the context of fail-proof banldng, because banks would be prohibited
from taking risks.
The fact that fail-proof banks would be forbidden  to take credit risk couid severely
curtail the availability  of credit in the economy, particularly since banks in many countries
are the dominant financial  intermediary. In order to counter this problem, individual  banks
would be authorized (and strongly encouraged  by the government)  to create a holding
company  that in turn would set up nonbank lending affiliates. These affiliates  either could
fund their own lending operations or be funded by the holding company  parent.  In addition
to setting up lending affiliates, the holding company could create other types of financial
affiliates  that could perform a wide range of financial  functions, including  all of the functions
that fail-proof banks would no longer be allowed to conduct.
To protect fail-proof banks against possible harm from their holding company
affiliation, all bank transactions with affiliates would be prohibited, except for those
transactions  that are absolutely  necessary (such as the payment of reasonable  bank dividends
to the parent and the payment of a bank's pro rata share of the consolidated  organization's
tax liability).  These necessary intercompany  transactions  would be subject to close
supervisory review to assure that the bank was not being abused in any way.
- 5  -It should  be noted that, relative  to conventional  banks  in a holding  company  structure,
fail-proof  banks  would  be particularly  well protected  from  possible  abuse. First, a fail-proof
bank  would  not be exposed  to a loss of public  confidence  in the event  of the failure  of a
holding  company  affiliate. The reason  is that depositors  would  know  that the bank  was
sound  and that their  deposits  were fully  insured  by the government.  Moreover,  in the highly
unlikely  event  th.t depositors  ignored  these  protections  and commenced  a bank run, tP' bank
would  have  a sizoable  amount  of high quality,  short-term  assets  that either  would  mature
within  a short period  of time or could  be sold  at very little  or no loss. Further, tht bank
would  have  access  to the lender  of last resort  and would  have  a large portfolio  of acceptable
collateral. Second,  there  would  be minimal  risk that a bank would  be forced  into adverse
transactions  with  a failing  holding  company  affiliate  because  the bank would  be prohibited
from  engaging  in almost  all types  of intercompany  transactions.  Moreover,  those  very few
types  of transactions  (like  the payment  of dividends  and taxes)  that would  be permitted  would
be subject  to close supervisory  scrutiny. Finally,  banks  would  not be exposed  to possible
"piercing  of the corporate  veil"  - that is, a suit brought  by creditors  of a failed  holding
company  affiliate  to force  the bank  to honor  the obligations  of the affiliate. In most
countries,  such  suits  would  not be sustained  unless  the bank had intermingled  its business
affairs  with the affiliate  -- something  that would  be virtually  impossible,  given  the severe
restrictions  on intercompany  transactions  by fail-proof  banks.
The implementation  of a fail-proof  banking  system  would  require  very large changes
in the balance  sheets  of banks  and other  participants  in the financial  system. In particular,
banks  would  have  to alter their  portfolios  by getting  rid of their  existing  risk assets  and
-6-replacing  them  with riskless  assets. Banks  could  accomplish  this through  a series  of
transactions  in the open market.
Alternatively,  assuming  that banks  create  holding  companies  (as they probabiy  would,
given  the strong  incentives  to do so), banks  could  sell their risk assets  to holding  company
affiliates  and use the proceeds  to acquire  riskiess  assets  in the market. In order to fund  their
purchase  of risk assets  from the banks, holding  company  affiliates  (or the parent  company)
would  have  to issue  debt in the market.
As discussed  earlier, fail-proof  banks  would  be required  to hold  a minimal  amount  of
capital  to absorb  irreducible  risks, including  fraud. However,  this amount  of capital  would
be considerably  less than the amount  that banks  currently  hold. Consequently,  banks  could
pass this excess  capital  up to the holding  company  in the form  of a special  dividend.
In summary,  once  all required  transactions  were completed,  banks  would  look much
like present  day money  market  funds. On the asset side  of their balance  sheet,  they would
hold short-term,  riskiess  assets. On the liability  side, they would  have  both transactions  and
short-term  time  deposits. The holding  company  part of the banking  organization  would  hold
risk assets  acquired  from the banks  and would  have  debt  outstanding  to the nonbank  sector  of
the financial  system. The nonba'k sector  of the financial  system  would  end up holding  the
newly  issued  debt of holding  company  affiliates,  which  they would  pay for by selling  riskiess
assets  to fail-proof  banks.
-7-Benefits of Fail-Proof Banking
The implementation  of fail-proof  bakiing would produce a nunber of public benefits.
The most important is that the nation would be assured of the long-term stability  of its
banking system. As a result. the nation's money  supply and payments system would be
protected from future disruptions, and the government would never be forced to intervene
and restructure the banking system, at potentially  considerable  cost to the public budget. A
fail-proof banking system also would provide depositors with a totally safe, conveniently
available financial  asset that would pay a market rate of return.  This result would contribute
to social welfare, particularly  in the case of small depositors, who tend to put a high
premium on the preservation of principal.
Another benefit of fail-proof banking is that it would permit a substantial  reduction
in the cost of regulating  the banking and financial  systems. In banking, the large amount of
resources devoted to the day to day supervision  and examination  of banks would be greatly
scaled back.  One reason is that bank portfolios  would no longer have to be reviewed and
evaluated  by bank examiners.  In addition, bank examiners  would no longer have to monitor
various risk-bearing  activities, such as securities  trading and foreign exchange operations,  in
which banks may presently engage.  Instead, under fail-proof  banking, examiners  would
focus their attention  solely on determining  whether banks were complying  with the various
fail-proof banking  restrictions, whether any permissible bank transactions  with affiliates  were
carried out on reasonable  terms, and whether there was any evidence of bank fraud.
- 8-In addition to reducing  the costs of bank supervision, the creation of a fail-proof
banking system would prevent the future spread of bank-type regulation  to other sectors of
the financial system, as could happen over time if conventional  banks were permitted to
expand into new types of financial  activities.  Under the proposal, any new services offered
by banking organizations  would have to be carried out by holding company  affiliates, which
would be subject to market discipline, rather than govemment regulation.
Fail-proof banking also would contribute to the improvement  of competition  in the
financial  sector.  In many countries conventional  banks are now prevented from entering
ceitain financial  activities that are deemed to be too risky.  With fail-proof  banking, banking
organizations  could engage in these activities through holding company  affiliates, thereby
increasing  the number of competitors  in the activity.  Also, fail-proof  banking would tend to
promote competitive  equality between banking organizations  and their nonbank  rivals. By
prohibiting  banks from lending to holding company  affiliates  and forcing these affiliates to do
their own funding, fail-proof  banking would prevent banks from transferring to their affiliates
the funding  advantages that various forms of govemment  protection  often accord banks.
Second, fail-proof  banking would level the playing field between holding  company affiliates
and nonbanking  firms by subjecting  both groups to the same degree of regulation. Under the
arrangement, holding company  affiliates would not be subjected  to bank-type regulation. As a
result, in those nonbanking  activities that are subject to other forms of regulation, these
affiliates would be regulated  just like nonbanking  firms.  Likewise, in those nonbanking
activities that are not subject to regulation, both holding  company affiliates  and their
nonbanking  rivals would be subject only to the discipline  of the marketplace.
-9-Implementation Problems
While the creation of a fail-proof  banking system would clearly produce important
public benefits, it might not be feasible  to implement  the prnposal, even in relatively robust
financial  systems. The most serious potential  implementation  problem is that there may not
be sufficient riskless assets in the finaicial system to allow all fail-proof banks to meet the
requirement  that they hold riskless portfolios. 3 Moreover, even if there were sufficient
riskless assets available for these banks, there might not be enough riskless assets left over
for other participants  in the financial  system that might want to hold such assets.
The most obvious way to solve this potential  implementation  problem would be to
relax, at least to some extent, the severe portfolio restrictions placed on banks, but find some
risk-reducing  offset that would maintain  the fail-proof  character of the banking system. Up to
this point in the study, it has been assumed that the only way for banks to achieve fail-proof
status is to take all of the risk out of banking.  However, it is theoretically  possible  for banks
to achieve fail-proof status by assuming some degree of portfolio  risk, so long as this risk is
fully offset by higher bank capital requirements. This proposition is shown in Figure I where
line AB represents alternative combinations  of portfolio  risk and required capital that would
be consistent with banks achieving  fail-proof status.
For purposes of discussion,  assume that point C on the vertical axis is the lowest level
of portfolio risk that it is feasible  for fail-proof  banks to achieve, given the current mix of
3For a detailed  discusion of the  problems  of implenentating  a fail-proof  banking  system  in the  United  Sates, see Robet J. Lawmnce
and  Samuel  H. Talley,  Implemening  a Fail-Proof  Banking  System,- Prceedinesof a Conference  on Bank  Stmzchet  and  Comnedttion.  Fedel
Rceerve  Bank  of Chicago, May 1988, pp. 344-59.
- 10  -FIGURE  1
Combinatons  of  Portfolio  Risk
and Required  Capital
Consistentwith  FailProof Baning
Portfolio
Risk  1
A  Required  Capital
- 11  -assets available in financial  markets.  All points above point C are feasible  portfolios, while
all points below are infeasible. Based on this assumption, the fail-proof  banking concept
could be modified  to allow banks to select any combination  of portfolio risk and required
capital (any point on line AB), so long as the portfolio  is feasible  (at or above point C' on
line AB).
In the real world, it is generally much more difficult to accurately  predict the level of
losses for high risk portfolios than for low risk portfolios.  As a x-sult, there would be a
tendency to introduce some degree of uncertainty  of actually attaining  a fail-proof  banking
system if banks were allowed to move to higher combinations  of portfolio risk and required
capital (to higher points on line AB).  Consequently,  for pragmatic reasons, it would
probably be desirable for the modified  fail-proof  banking concept to place some upper limit
on permissible  combinations  of portfolio  risk and required capital (for example, not allowing
banks to move beyond point D' on line AB).  In practice, this would  probably mean that
banks would be limited to holding portfolios made up of riskless and relatively low risk
assets.
While relaxing the severe portfolio restrictions  placed on fail-proof banks is the most
obvious way to overcome an insufficiency  of risldess assets, it also might be possible to
overcome this problem by reducing fail-proof  banks' demand for such assets. This could be
done by limiting the types of deposits that fail-proof banks can issue to interest-bearing
transactions  accounts. These deposits  are the ones that are associated  with the crucial
functions that banks perform -- operating the payments system and providing the bulk of the
nation's money supply.  By contrast, the issuance  of time deposits provides the public with
- 12  -an investment  vehicle -- a function that could be readily performed by other endties in the
financial system.
Financial Market Effects
Even if the fail-proof banking proposal were modified  to allow banks to acquire low
risk assets, the portfolio transactions  that banks would be required to make almost certainly
would result in considerable  pressures and short-term dislocations  in financial markets.  There
are two ways that banks could adjust their portfolios to meet the riskless or low risk portfolio
requirement.  First, banks could sell all of their higher risk assets in the open market and use
the proceeds to buy riskless or low risk assets.  These transactions  would tend to drive up
interest rates on higher risk assets and drive down interest rates on riskless and lower risk
assets, thereby increasing  existing interest rate differentials  between these two groups of
assets.  The second (and more likely) way for banks to adjust their portfolios would be to
sell their riskier assets to holding company  affiliates and use the proceeds to buy riskless and
low risk assets in the open market. Holding company  affiliates, in turn, would have to issue
debt in the open market in order to fund their asset purchases from the banks.  The end
result of this second alternative  would be the same as the first - a widening  of existing
interest rate differentials.  Bank  purchases of riskless and low risk assets would drive down
the rates on these assets, and the debt issued by holding company  affiliates would drive up
rates on higher risk assets.  It is assumed that the debt issued by holding  company  affiliates
- 13  -would be in the higher risk category because the portfolios  of these affiliates  would consist of
higher risk assets.
The widening of existing interest rate differentials  would produce both winners and
losers in financial markets. The winners would  be risldess and low risk borrowers, who
would be able to borrow at lower rates than previously.  This group of borrowers
presumably  would include the national government  and those business and local government
borrowers that already have high credit ratings or can obtain credit enhancements  at an
acceptable price.  The losers would include all other borrowers who have lower credit ratings
and could not obtain or afford credit enhancements. This group of borrowers presumably
would include most businesses  and local governments,  and virtually all consumers.
The extent to which existing interest rate differentials would widen would  depend on
two primary factors: (1) the size of the nation's banking system, because this would
determine the magnitude  of the required portfolio adjustments;  and (2) the depth and
responsiveness  of the nation's financial  markets. In most developed  countries, the banidng
system is an important, but not dominant, factor in the financial  system. Likewise, financial
markets tend to be quite deep and responsive  to pressures.  In contrast, in developing
countries the banling system tends to dominate  the financial  system, and financial  markets
tend to be shallow  and unresponsive  to pressures.  As a result, it is probable that the
implementation  of fail-proof  banking would have a substantially  greater effect on rate
differentials  in developing countries  than in developed  ones.  Moreover, it is possible  that in
many developing  countries the increase  in interest rates on higher risk assets would be so
large that it would force most higher risk borrowers out of the market.
- 14  -In addition to increasing interest rate differentials, the implementation  of a fail-proof
banking system would shift risks now lodged in the banking system to other participants  in
the financial  system.  Assuming  that banks chose to set up holding  companies  and then sold
their higher risk assets to holding company  affiliates, these affiliates would take on
substantial  portfolio risk.  In addition, the nonbank  sector of the financial  system would take
on greater risk because this sector would acquire risk-bearing  holding company  debt, while
selling riskless and low risk assets to fail-proof  banks.
The implications  of increasing  the risk exposure of the nonbank  sector are difficult to
evaluate except in the context of known situations. However, a major problem could arise if
a sizeable  portion of the increased risk were lodged  in certain financial  institutions,  such as
insurance companies, whose soundness  has important  public policy implications. Moreover,
these nonbank institutions  typically  do not the have the governmental  support mechanisms,
such as access to the lender of last resort, that are normally accorded to banks.
Summary  and  Conclusion
Public policy proposals tend to fall into two broad groups -- those that advocate
essentially marginal changes in well functioning  systems, and those that call for radical
changes in systems that are perceived to be seriously deficient. The fail-proof banking
proposal clearly falls into the latter category. The proposal is based on the view that nations
have improperly designed their banking and financial  systems, and only radical changes can
correct the situation.  In particular, nations have given crucial functions  to banks, including
- 15  -operating the nation's payments system and providing  the bulk of the nation's money supply,
and then allowed these banks to take sizeable risks and engage in nonessential functions  that
have often undermined  these crucial functions. The fail-proof banking proposal would  alter
this situation by turning banks into limited purpose, riskless institutions  that would
permanently  guarantee  that banks would perform their crucial functions  effectively.
In order to facilitate the large scale transformation  of the financial system that the
creation of a fail-proof  banking system would require, the proposal would employ a policy
variable -- changes in the organizational  structure  of banks -- that nations have seldom relied
upon.  By creating holding companies,  banking organizations  would be able to operate fail-
proof banks, while continuing to conduct all previous activies  through affiliated companies.
Moreover, the creation of holding  companies  would assure that the wide-ranging skills now
possessed by banks could be retained within the same consolidated  organization.
As indicated in this paper, the public benefits from  installing  a fail-proof  banking
system would be impressive. Such a system would  assure that a nation would have a smooth
functioning  payments system and a stable money supply.  Also, fail-proof banking would
greatly reduce the resources that must be devoted to the supervision  and regulation  of banks,
would avoid the threat of a gradual expansion  of bank-type  regulation throughout  the
financial  sector as banks expand the scope of their activities over time, and would establish  a
more level competitive  playing field between banking  and nonbanking  organizations  in those
financial  areas where they compete.
There are two major problems with attempting  to establish  a fail-proof banking
system.  First, it may not be feasible to establish  such a system, at least in its "pure" form,
- 16  -because of an insufficiency  of riskless assets in the financial  system.  However, this
implementation  problem probably could be overcome in some countries by also allowing fail-
proof banks to hold low risk assets and offsetting the resulting  portfolio risk with higher
capital requirements.  In the event that this modification  was not sufficient,  banks could be
confined to issuing only transactions  deposits, thereby shrinking  the size of banks and the
amount of riskless and low risk assets that they would need to hold.
The second major problem with the fail-proof  banking proposal is that it would have
certain adverse financial  market effects.  First, the proposal would  alter the existing interest
rate structure and lead to higher interest rates for most borrowers -- all of those who are not
riskless or low risk borrowers.  These increased interest rates also might force some of these
higher risk borrowers out of the market.  Second,  assuming that the overall risk of the
financial system is not materially  changed, the creation of a fail-proof  banking system would
result in the nonbank sector of the financial  system becoming riskier and more susceptible  to
financial  crises.
In general, it is expected that the creation of fail-proof  banking systems would
produce greater benefits in developing  countries than in developed  one.  The reason is that
developing  countries are much more prone to banking instability, in part due to having less
stable economies, less experienced  bank management,  and less effective  bank supervision.
On the other hand, it would be much more difficult to implement  fail-proof  banking systems
in developing  countries.  These countries typically  have only very limited amounts of riskless
and low risk assets in their financial  systems.  In addition, the destabilizing  effects of the
proposal on financial  markets would be much greater in developing  countries because:
- 17  -(1)  banks tend to dominate the financial  system; and (2) financial  markets are typically  thin
and would be much less able to accommodate  large scale financial  asset transactions  without
dramatic changes in the structure of interest rates.
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